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Abstract 
This document explores the potential for the use of a market-based instrument to contribute to reducing the emissions of 
particulate matter of less than 10 micrometres from household heating appliances in the framework of the review of the 
Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution. The study is focused on the assessment of the economic and environmental impacts of 
possible scrappage policies for promoting the accelerated replacement of existing heating appliances with cleaner ones. 
Under these policy programmes, households replacing an old appliance with a cleaner one would receive a subsidy from 
the government. This subsidy would compensate households for the residual value of the scrapped appliance and the 
opportunity costs of the early investment in a new one. 
Two different scenarios are analysed: The scrappage and replacement of all the different types of conventional appliances 
that do not incorporate any emission control technology ('non-controlled'), and the scrappage and replacement of only 
'non-controlled' firewood- and hard-coal-fired manual single house boilers. It is assumed that the scrappage programme 
is in force between 2018 and 2020. For each scenario, the study focuses on the effects of different levels of replacement 
of the 'non-controlled' appliances and the size of subsidies relative to the investment costs. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This document explores the potential for the use of a market-based instrument to 
contribute to reducing the emissions of particulate matter of less than 10 micrometres 
(PM10) from household heating appliances in the framework of the review of the Thematic 
Strategy on Air Pollution (TSAP). The study is focused on the assessment of the economic 
and environmental impacts of possible scrappage policies for promoting the accelerated 
replacement of existing heating appliances with cleaner ones. Under these policy 
programmes, households replacing an old appliance with a cleaner one would receive a 
subsidy from the government. This subsidy would compensate households for the residual 
value of the scrapped appliance and the opportunity costs of the early investment in a new 
one. 
Two different scenarios are analysed: a 'Scrappage All' scenario where all the different 
types of conventional appliances that do not incorporate any emission control technology 
('non-controlled' appliances) are replaced, and a 'Scrappage SHB' scenario where only 'non-
controlled' firewood- and hard-coal-fired manual single house boilers (SHB) are replaced. It 
is assumed that the scrappage programme is in force for three years (between 2018 and 
2020). For each of these scenarios, the study further focuses on the effects of different 
levels of replacement of the 'non-controlled' appliances and the size of subsidies relative to 
the investment costs. 
Results for the EU-27 show that a scrappage programme designed to replace all types of 
'non-controlled' appliances, and with subsidies limited to 20% of the investment costs, 
could contribute to the reduction of the emissions of PM10 from household heating 
appliances in 2020 by 18% (-79 kt), with a reduction of 7.4% (-22 kt) with respect to the 
average emissions of the period 2018-2030. This early replacement would increase the 
average annual investment costs of the period 2018-2030 by 11% (+ EUR 1.5 billion/year). 
Total subsidies to compensate households for the early replacement would amount to 
EUR 9.4 billion during the period 2018-2020. Health benefits of this policy scenario would 
total between EUR 0.9 billion and 2.7 billion per year. This scheme would increase the Gross 
Value Added (GVA) by EUR 2.3 billion/year.  
The scrappage mechanism that only targets SHB, and with subsidies limited to 20% of the 
costs, could achieve 9% of the reduction resulting from the previous 'Scrappage All' 
scenario, while cutting the abatement costs and subsidies to 3.7% and 4.9% respectively. 
This mechanism would reduce PM10 emissions in 2020 by 3% (-13.3 kt) and the average 
emissions of the period 2018-2030 by 0.7% (-2.1 kt), and the costs would increase by 
0.5% (EUR 55.6 million/year). Total subsidies during the period 2018-2020 would sum to 
EUR 411 million. Health benefits would range from EUR 147 million to EUR 424 million per 
year. Around 50% of the investment costs and subsidies, and 61% of the reduction in 
PM10 emissions, would be generated by the accelerated replacement of SHB in Poland. 
This scrappage mechanism would increase the GVA by EUR 106 million/year; 42% of the 
total increase in the GVA would be in Poland, 11% in Germany, 8.5% in Slovenia and 7% in 
the United Kingdom. 
 ii 
Content 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... I 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1 
2. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................................................ 1 
3. RESULTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
3.1. Emissions from household heating appliances ...................................................................................................... 3 
3.2. Investment costs and macroeconomic impacts .................................................................................................... 5 
3.3. Cost-benefit analysis ......................................................................................................................................................... 10 
4. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................ 12 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................... 14 
ANNEX ................................................................................................................................................................ 15 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION
The Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution (TSAP) of 2005 (CEC, 2005) established objectives 
for the protection of health and the environment from the adverse impacts of air pollution. 
The Commission’s 2013 work programme includes a comprehensive review of the Strategy 
with a view to making further progress towards the objective of the Environment Action 
Programme (established in the 6th and confirmed in the 7th EAP; CEC, 2013) of attaining 
'levels of air quality that do not give rise to significant negative impacts on, and risks to 
human health and the environment'. This review requires a comprehensive and integrated 
assessment of different policy options and instruments to contribute to the achievement of 
the TSAP objectives. 
Over the last few decades, there has been growing concern about the impact on human 
health of the exposure to fine particles. One of the main sources of emissions of these 
pollutants is the combustion of solid fuels and biomass in household heating appliances. As 
a result, the review of the TSAP has devoted specific attention to the reduction of the 
emissions of fine particulate matter from household heating appliances.  
In this context, this document explores the potential for the use of market-based 
instruments to contribute to the reduction of the emissions of particulate matter of less 
than 10 micrometres (PM10) from the combustion of solid fuels in household heating 
appliances which do not incorporate any emission control technology ('non-controlled' 
appliances). The study is focused on the assessment of the economic and environmental 
impacts of different scrappage systems for the purpose of promoting the early 
replacement of existing heating appliances with cleaner ones. Two different systems are 
analysed: a 'Scrappage All' scenario where all the different types of 'non-controlled' 
appliances are replaced, and 'Scrappage SHB' scenario where only firewood- and hard-coal-
fired manual single house boilers (SHB) are targeted. 
The modelling exercise is carried out in two steps. First, a model relating the use of energy, 
emissions, technologies and costs is developed in order to simulate the effects in terms of 
PM10 emissions and costs of the penetration of different technologies. This model was 
calibrated using relevant data from the GAINS model (see1 Amann et al., 2011, for details 
on the GAINS model, and Klimont et al., 2002, for the modelling of PM10). Second, the cost 
structures resulting from this micro-model are introduced into the FIDELIO model in order 
to compute the macroeconomic impacts of each scenario in terms of changes in the Gross 
Value Added (GVA) (for details about FIDELIO, see Kratena et al., 2013). 
2. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
The following three scenarios are considered: 
 The 'Baseline' corresponds to the GAINS TSAP-Dec2012, TSAP_Baseline_Nov12
scenario.
 On top of the 'Baseline' scenario, the 'Ecodesign' scenario assumes that, following
the Commission regulations implementing the Ecodesign Directive (Directive
2009/125/EC) for local space heaters and solid fuel boilers (including fireplaces,
automatic and manual single house boilers, and stoves), all new appliances sold
1 http://gains.iiasa.ac.at/models/ 
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from 2018 onwards2 will comply with the emission standards established by the 
new legislation. According to this scenario, the stock of 'non-controlled' fireplaces, 
manual single house boilers and stoves would be gradually replaced by cleaner ones 
according to their depreciation rates, in such a way that by around 2045 the whole 
stock of 'non-controlled' appliances would have been replaced. 
 The 'Scrappage' scenario consists of the introduction of an early scrapping 
mechanism to promote accelerated penetration of cleaner technologies, taking as a 
starting point the composition of the stock of appliances of the 'Ecodesign' scenario. 
The objective of this policy is to reduce the emissions of PM10 from household 
heating appliances by accelerating the replacement of all or part of the existing 
'non-controlled' appliances by new appliances between 2018 and 2020. Households 
replacing an old appliance with a cleaner one are assumed to receive a subsidy 
from the government. This subsidy will compensate households for the opportunity 
costs of early replacement. The mechanism is designed to be budget-neutral as the 
subsidy is compensated by an equivalent reduction in government expenditures. We 
assume that the scrappage mechanism is in place for three years starting from 
2018 and is applicable only to fireplaces, manual single house boilers3 and stoves 
(henceforth referred to as eligible appliances). 4 This scenario explores two different 
schemes of scrappage depending on the type of appliances targeted. In the first 
scheme, called 'Scrappage All', the replacement of all types of eligible 'non-
controlled' appliances is subsidised. This scheme could achieve the maximum 
feasible reduction in emissions by replacing, in 2018-2020, all the eligible 'non-
controlled' appliances reported by the 'Ecodesign' scenario for the year 2020. 
However, replacing the entire stock of 'non-controlled' appliances within the space 
of a few years could be very costly. Therefore, we also analyse the effects of 
replacing different shares of the stock of 'non-controlled' appliances. In the second 
scheme, called 'Scrappage SHB', only the replacement of eligible firewood- and 
coal-fired manual single house boilers (SHB) is subsidised; the rationale of this 
option is that 'non-controlled' firewood- and coal-fired SHB are among the most 
polluting and widespread installations, and their replacement could deliver high 
health benefits with limited expenditure. Again, different replacement shares are 
analysed. 
Further details on the construction of these scenarios can be found in the Annex. 
 
                                              
2 The scenario was built based on an initial proposal of the ecodesign regulation, which was later modified: 
The final text adopted by the European Commission establishes 1st January 2020 for solid fuel local space 
heating and 1-1-2022 for solid fuel boilers, instead of 2018 as for the rest of appliances. Besides, different 
Emission Limit Values where eventually adopted: In the impact assessment, the limits differentiated between 
wood boilers (20 microgr/m3) and coal (40 microgr/m3). Now they differentiate between manual 
(60 microgr/m3) and automatic (540 microgr/m3) boilers. The results for this scenario can therefore not be 
understood as representing an estimate of the costs or benefits of the actual ecodesign regulation. 
3 The scrappage mechanism does not consider the replacement of automatic single house boilers, since the 
emissions of these appliances are low compared to other appliances. 
4 The full list of appliances can be found in Table A2 of the Annex. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1. Emissions from household heating appliances 
Figure 1 shows the development of the emissions of PM10 from EU-27 household heating 
appliances for the 'Baseline', 'Ecodesign' and 'Scrappage' scenarios for the period 2018-
2045. Emissions of particulate matter in the 'Baseline' scenario decrease by 178 kilotonnes 
(kt), from 543 kt in 2018 to 365 kt in 2045 (-33%); and focusing on the period 2018-2030, 
emissions are reduced by 131kt (-24%). The emission standards proposed for fireplaces, 
single house boilers and stoves in the preparatory studies for setting the Ecodesign 
requirements of the Ecodesign Directive for solid fuel small combustion installations (Bio 
Intelligence Service, 2010) are considerably lower than the current emission coefficients of 
new appliances currently on the market.5 Consequently, the introduction of the new 
particulate matter emission standards for those heating appliances could contribute to a 
significant reduction in emissions.  
 
Figure 1. Change in the emissions of PM10 (kt) from household heating appliances for different 
policy scenarios, EU-27, 2018-2045 
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Source: GAINS and own elaboration. 
Note: Each area presents the change in the emissions between two scenarios, except in the 
'Scrappage All' scenario for which the area represents the emissions of the scenario. The reductions 
in the emissions of the scrappage scenarios correspond to the cases in which the whole stock of 
'non-controlled' appliances and SHB is replaced. 
After the entry into force of the implementing measures of the Ecodesign Directive for solid 
fuel and biomass local space heaters and boilers, the stock of appliances6 would be 
gradually replaced by cleaner ones following their turnover rates, in such a way that in 
                                              
5 See http://gains.iiasa.ac.at/models/ 
6 It has been assumed that new standards affects to fireplaces, stoves and automatic and manual single 
house oilers. 
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2045 the whole stock of appliances would have been replaced. As a consequence7, PM10 
emissions would be reduced by 16% (-87 kt) compared to the levels of 2020, by 69% (-
282 kt) relative to the levels of 2030, and by 82% (-297 kt) relative to the levels of 2045. 
The average emissions abated between 2018 and 2030 would total 169 kt (241 kt for the 
period 2018-2045).  
Table 1. Change in the PM10 emissions of the 'Ecodesign' scenario in 2020 after the introduction 
of a scrappage mechanism, by Member State 
Scrappage All Scrappage SHB 
tonnes % tonnes % 
Austria -670 -12.96% -105 -2.03% 
Belgium -1 556 -45.53% -161 -4.71% 
Bulgaria -5 817 -52.99% -851 -7.75% 
Cyprus -23 -40.07% -2 -3.89% 
Czech Rep. -7 898 -58.39% -2 588 -19.13% 
Denmark -7 046 -56.30% -1 588 -12.68% 
Estonia -2 019 -53.20% -552 -14.55% 
Finland -1 790 -27.55% -1 234 -18.99% 
France -30 707 -38.76% -923 -1.16% 
Germany -3 788 -15.99% -225 -0.95% 
Greece -6 825 -73.62% -491 -5.30% 
Hungary -8 021 -79.09% -1 903 -18.76% 
Ireland -1 615 -45.05% -916 -25.55% 
Italy -19 823 -76.14% -29 -0.11% 
Latvia -5 729 -54.30% -229 -2.17% 
Lithuania -2 354 -52.63% -718 -16.06% 
Luxembourg -68 -49.52% -5 -3.55% 
Malta 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Netherlands -88 -4.43% 0 0.00% 
Poland -97 558 -69.56% -28 942 -20.64% 
Portugal -8 847 -69.98% -1 318 -10.42% 
Romania -20 940 -53.17% -1 120 -2.84% 
Slovakia -1 950 -80.34% -70 -2.86% 
Slovenia -2 058 -78.81% -1 923 -73.66% 
Spain -5 410 -32.09% -156 -0.92% 
Sweden -17 -0.63% 0 0.00% 
United Kingdom -4 600 -64.22% -1 353 -18.90% 
EU-27 -247 216 -55.04% -47 401 -10.55% 
EU-27 average 2018-2030 -125 847 -41.09% -22 449 -7.33% 
Source: GAINS and own elaboration. 
Note: The reductions in the emissions of the scrappage scenarios correspond to the 
cases in which all the stock of 'non-controlled' appliances and SHB is replaced. 
After the introduction of the new standards, in the year 2020 almost 60% (260 kt) of the 
emissions from household heating appliances are estimated to be released by eligible 'non-
controlled' appliances (see Table A3 of the Annex), of which 66% corresponds to stoves, 
20% to fireplaces, and 14% to manual single house boilers. At the country level, 40% of 
the emissions from 'non-controlled' appliances are located in Poland, 12% in France, 8.4% 
in Romania and 7.9% in Italy. In the rest of the Member States, emissions from 'non-
controlled' appliances are below 5%. For SHB, 80% of the emissions are concentrated in 
7 See footnote 2. 
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Poland, followed by the Czech Republic (5.1%), Hungary (4%), Ireland (2.9%) and the United 
Kingdom (2.4%). 
In this context, the introduction of a scrappage mechanism contributes to a net reduction of 
the PM10 emissions of the 'Ecodesign' scenario in 2020 ranging from 11% (-47 kt) to 55% 
(-247 kt), depending on whether only SHB or all 'non-controlled' appliances are replaced 
(Table 1). These reduction levels correspond to the cases in which the scrappage 
mechanism aims to replace 100% of 'non-controlled' appliances. A reduction in the 
replacement target reduces the gap between the scrappage scenarios and the 'Ecodesign' 
scenario proportionally. The average reduction of PM10 emissions for the period 2018-
2030 (last row in Table 1) would range between 22 kt for the 'Scrappage SHB' scenario 
(green area in Figure 1) and 126 kt for the 'Scrappage All' scenario (green plus red areas in 
Figure 1).  
Table 1 and Table A1 of the Annex show the reductions in the emissions in 2020 by each 
Member State (MS) after the introduction of the scrappage mechanism. In the 'Scrappage 
All' scenarios, the additional reduction in the emissions of PM10 is estimated to be below 
40% in only 8 MS. In Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and the 
United Kingdom, the reduction in the emissions is above 60%. In contrast, in the 'Scrappage 
SHB' scenario, the additional reduction in the emissions of PM10 is estimated to be above 
20% in only 3 MS: Slovenia (-74%), Poland (-21%), and Ireland (-26%). 
In absolute values, in the 'Scrappage All' scenario most of the reduction in the emissions 
comes from the replacement of firewood- and coal-fired stoves, and fireplaces. Poland is 
the MS which contributes most to the overall reduction (39%), followed by France (12%), 
Romania (8.5%) and Italy (8%). In the 'Scrappage SHB' scenario, the reduction in PM10 
emissions from Polish SHB represents around 61% of the total effect of the scrappage 
mechanism in the whole EU-27. 
 
3.2. Investment costs and macroeconomic impacts 
Figure 2 summarises the additional annualised investment costs derived from the 
'Ecodesign' scenario8 and from the scrappage policy scenarios. In the 'Ecodesign' scenario, 
the annual additional costs amount to almost EUR 5.9 billion9 for the year 2020, EUR 14.1 
billion for 2025 and EUR 21.4 billion for 2025. Investment costs reach a maximum of 
EUR 24.1 billion in 2032 and decrease slightly to EUR 23.5 billion in 2045. The average 
annualised cost derived from the 'Ecodesign' scenario between 2018 and 2030 amounts to 
EUR 12.3 billion/year. Note in any case that these costs are not to be interpreted as the 
overall net costs of the policy, as they do not take into account the substitution effects and 
fuel savings delivered by the improved energy efficiency of Ecodesign-compliant 
installations. The investment costs are to be interpreted as an upper limit since substitution 
effects are not taken into account. 
The implementation of a scrappage mechanism increases the average annualised costs 
between 2018 and 2030 by as much as EUR 314 million (+2.6%) for the case in which the 
entire stock of 'non-controlled' SHB is replaced and by EUR 12.3 billion/year (+52%) when 
all the stock of 'non-controlled' appliances is replaced. 
                                              
8 See footnote 2. 
9 All the economic variables are expressed in constant 2005 euros. 
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Figure 2. Change in annualised investment costs (million €) for different policy scenarios, EU-27, 
2020-2045 
 
Source: GAINS and own elaboration. 
Note: Each area presents the change in the annualised investment costs between two scenarios. 
Costs correspond to the cases in which the whole stock of 'non-controlled' appliances and SHB is 
replaced. 
 
The previous figures on investment costs refer to the average annualised cost of the 
scrappage mechanism between 2018 and 2030. However, according to the definition of the 
scrappage mechanism, the expenditure in new appliances would be executed between the 
years 2018 and 2020. In these three years, the investment in new appliances would total 
EUR 146 billion in the 'Scrappage All' scenario and EUR 18.8 billion in the 'Scrappage SHB' 
scenario. In addition, government would have to compensate households for the early 
replacement of old appliances. 
It is obvious that the mechanism of the scrappage policy would not target all the 
appliances regardless of their age. In practice, the policy target would be defined 
somewhere along the cost-abatement curve (Figure 3). This curve shows the total 
investment costs and subsidies between 2018 and 2020 associated with a certain level of 
reduction in PM10 emissions. For instance, for the 'Scrappage All' scenario, the investment 
cost associated with reaching 50% of the total emissions that can be abated with the 
scrappage programme is EUR 73 billion and the associated subsides are EUR 22.9 billion, 
equivalent to 31% of the investment costs (yellow circle in left-hand part of Figure 3). 
However, it is important to highlight that, in practice, subsidies do not usually exceed 20% 
of the investment costs (Michelsen and Madlener, 2012). According to the data reported in 
Figure 3 (red circles and dashed red lines), in the 'Scrappage All' scenario it would be 
feasible to get around 32% of the maximum emission reduction that can be achieved via 
scrappage by subsidising 20% of the investment costs. In the case of the 'Scrappage SHB' 
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scenario, a subsidy covering 20% of the investment costs would achieve 4.9% of the 
maximum emission reduction. 
 
Figure 3. Total additional investment costs and subsidies (million €), and share of investment 
covered by subsidies according to the share of PM10 emissions abated for different scrappage 
scenarios, EU-27, 2018-2020 
'Scrappage All' 'Scrappage SHB' 
  
Source: own elaboration. 
Note1: In both scenarios 100% abated emissions corresponds to the maximum average annual reduction in PM10 
emissions that can be obtained in the period 2018-2030 by the replacement of all 'non-controlled' appliances (i.e. 126 kt). 
Note2: Costs refer to the total additional investment costs between 2018 and 2020 compared to the costs of the 
'Ecodesign' scenario. 
 
For the case of a subsidy covering 20% of the investment costs of the scrappage of all 
types of 'non-controlled' appliances, average PM10 emissions in the period 2018-2030 are 
estimated to be reduced by 7% (-22 kt) with respect the average emissions of the 
'Ecodesign' scenario in the period 2018-2030, and the emissions of the year 2020 by 18% 
(-79 kt). In such a case, total investment costs and subsidies during the three years in 
which the scrappage system operates would amount to EUR 47 billion and EUR 9.4 billion 
respectively. For the period 2018-2030, the average annualised costs would total 
EUR 1.5 billion (+17%) and subsidies EUR 521 million (Table 2). A similar subsidy-to-costs 
ratio in the 'Scrappage SHB' mechanism could reduce the average emissions of the period 
2018-2030 by 2.1 kt (-0.7%), while limiting the increase in total investment costs and 
subsidies with respect to the 'Ecodesign' scenarios to EUR 2.1 billion and EUR 411 million 
respectively. In terms of average annualised costs, investment costs and subsides would 
total EUR 56 million (+0.5%) and EUR 25.6 million respectively. 
In a 'Scrappage All' scenario in which subsidies cover 20% of costs, the countries with the 
highest growth in abatement costs are Slovenia (+32%), Slovakia (+29%), Hungary (25%) 
and Italy (24%) (see Table 2). In Poland, which shows the largest reduction in PM10 
emissions in absolute terms, costs are estimated to increase by 21%. Poland would 
represent 34% of the total replacement costs of the EU-27, followed by France (12%), and 
Italy (10%). In the case of Poland, high costs are related to the replacement of a large 
number of firewood and hard coal stoves, and hard-coal-fired SHB, while in Italy and 
France the main reason for high costs is the replacement of firewood stoves, which have 
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high unit costs and long lifetimes. This group of countries also concentrates most of the 
subsidies (Poland 32%, France 15%, and Italy 12%). 
 
Table 2. Average annualised subsidies and investment costs and average annual emissions abated 
of a scrappage mechanism subsidising 20%, 2018-2030 
 Scrappage All  Scrappage SHB 
 Subsidy  Investment cost  Emissions  Subsidy  Investment cost  Emissions 
 Million €  Million € change  t change  Million €  Million € change  t change 
Austria 3.0  7.7 2.9%  -57.9 -1.4%  0.1  0.1 0.1%  -1.3 0.0% 
Belgium 6.6  19.9 10.7%  -203.4 -8.3%  0.1  0.3 0.2%  -15.6 -0.6% 
Bulgaria 11.8  29.0 11.1%  -479.7 -6.8%  0.6  2.2 0.8%  -110.8 -1.6% 
Cyprus 0.1  0.1 20.5%  -1.6 -3.8%  0.0  0.0 0.5%  -0.1 -0.2% 
Czech Rep. 15.5  66.8 16.9%  -905.3 -9.6%  1.9  3.5 1.1%  149.9 1.6% 
Denmark 10.5  24.8 9.7%  -537.1 -6.2%  0.4  0.7 0.3%  -60.8 -0.7% 
Estonia 3.7  9.8 10.8%  -219.9 -8.4%  0.1  0.3 0.4%  -51.8 -2.0% 
Finland 2.8  8.0 2.1%  -242.0 -5.2%  0.3  0.8 0.2%  -125.9 -2.7% 
France 76.3  181.0 6.0%  434.5 0.8%  0.7  1.1 0.0%  49.5 0.1% 
Germany 17.0  58.0 3.9%  -587.6 -2.9%  0.2  0.7 0.0%  -31.6 -0.2% 
Greece 14.7  30.6 18.9%  -500.4 -8.7%  0.4  0.7 0.4%  -14.0 -0.2% 
Hungary 14.6  42.7 25.3%  -579.1 -8.8%  1.4  2.4 1.7%  136.2 2.1% 
Ireland 5.3  27.1 16.9%  -89.8 -3.5%  0.6  0.8 0.7%  135.6 5.2% 
Italy 61.1  153.2 24.0%  -2 678.5 -14.7%  0.0  0.1 0.0%  -5.7 0.0% 
Latvia 11.7  37.1 13.1%  -585.3 -8.1%  0.2  0.2 0.1%  24.2 0.3% 
Lithuania 5.8  15.1 12.5%  -209.0 -7.0%  0.6  0.9 0.9%  -3.6 -0.1% 
Luxembourg 0.2  0.5 10.8%  -8.6 -9.0%  0.0  0.0 0.2%  -0.4 -0.5% 
Malta 0.0  0.0 0.0%  0.0 0.0%  0.0  0.0 0.0%  0.0 0.0% 
Netherlands 0.4  1.7 0.9%  -17.5 -1.0%  0.0  0.0 0.0%  0.0 0.0% 
Poland 167.3  509.8 20.6%  -9 999.2 -10.7%  13.5  28.0 1.3%  -1 619.0 -1.7% 
Portugal 18.3  48.6 16.4%  -959.3 -11.3%  1.0  2.6 0.9%  -118.0 -1.4% 
Romania 40.5  99.3 9.1%  -1 644.1 -6.5%  0.9  4.5 0.3%  -219.6 -0.9% 
Slovakia 3.8  15.9 29.3%  -318.2 -18.9%  0.1  0.2 0.3%  -8.7 -0.5% 
Slovenia 2.4  4.5 31.7%  -147.3 -9.1%  1.5  2.9 20.2%  -96.0 -5.9% 
Spain 13.4  48.8 7.2%  -755.4 -6.3%  0.1  0.2 0.0%  -0.6 0.0% 
Sweden 0.1  1.4 1.4%  -13.2 -0.6%  0.0  0.0 0.0%  0.0 0.0% 
United Kingdom 13.9  46.7 18.5%  -550.9 -10.9%  1.0  2.3 1.0%  -64.5 -1.3% 
EU-27 520.6  1 488.5 11.4%  -21 856.0 -7.1%  25.6  55.6 0.5%  -2 052.4 -0.7% 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note: Additional costs and subsidies refer to the average annualised values of the period between 2018 and 2020 compared to the costs of the 'Ecodesign' scenario. 
Emissions refer to the average annual emissions of the period 2018-2030 compared to those of the 'Ecodesign' scenario. 
 
On the other hand, in the 'Scrappage SHB' scenario with subsidies limited to cover 20% of 
the investment costs, the mechanism would result in an increase in control costs of over 
5% compared to the 'Ecodesign' scenario only in Poland (+20%), where 50% of the 
investment costs and 53% of the subsidies would be concentrated.  
Investment in the different technologies defined in each scenario has an impact on the 
aggregated gross value added (GVA) of each of the MS in several ways. On the one hand, 
production of Ecodesign-compliant appliances generates an increase in the value added of 
the sectors involved in their production. This impact on GVA translates into an increase in 
the income of households, which in turn causes further increases in the final demand. On 
the other hand, the increase in public transfers to households is compensated by a 
reduction in its expenditure, which will have a negative impact in terms of GVA. 
Investment in the technologies of the 'Ecodesign' scenario would increase the GVA of the 
EU-27 economy by EUR 14 billion/year (+0.05%) in the period 2018-2030. A scrappage 
mechanism with a subsidy covering 20% of the investment costs is estimated to increase 
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the GVA by EUR 2.3 billion/year when the programme is targeted at all types of 'non-
controlled' appliances and by EUR 106 million/year when the mechanism applies only to 
SHB (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Average annual change in the Gross Value Added of a scrappage mechanism subsidising 
20% of investment costs 
 Scrappage All Scrappage SHB 
 Million € % Million € % 
Austria 34.9 10.52% 1.6 0.49% 
Belgium 40.3 21.54% 1.2 0.64% 
Bulgaria 3.8 11.43% 0.0 0.14% 
Cyprus 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.56% 
Czech Rep. 30.8 8.42% 4.2 1.15% 
Denmark 55.3 18.37% 2.0 0.66% 
Estonia 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.00% 
Finland 16.2 4.98% 1.3 0.41% 
France 280.8 11.60% 4.5 0.19% 
Germany 276.5 10.76% 11.5 0.45% 
Greece 62.3 37.24% 1.6 0.93% 
Hungary 47.5 23.17% 4.3 2.10% 
Ireland 17.1 15.79% 1.8 1.66% 
Italy 337.1 26.75% 4.7 0.37% 
Latvia 1.0 0.48% 0.0 0.00% 
Lithuania 16.6 18.53% 1.6 1.82% 
Luxembourg 2.3 13.16% 0.1 0.53% 
Malta 0.0 0.00% 0.0 0.20% 
Netherlands 25.3 13.22% 1.1 0.60% 
Poland 719.9 30.52% 44.6 1.89% 
Portugal 32.9 15.83% 0.0 0.00% 
Romania 93.4 9.72% 0.0 0.00% 
Slovakia 25.2 23.45% 0.7 0.68% 
Slovenia 15.0 36.10% 8.5 20.49% 
Spain 77.7 11.34% 2.2 0.32% 
Sweden 16.0 7.78% 0.9 0.44% 
United Kingdom 110.1 18.97% 7.0 1.20% 
EU-27 2 338.1 16.70% 105.6 0.76% 
Source: GAINS and own elaboration. 
Note: Average annual change in the Gross Value Added refers to the 
average annual change in the Gross Value Added of the period between 
2018 and 2020 compared to the average annual change in the Gross 
Value Added of the 'Ecodesign' scenario. 
 
By MS, in both scenarios the impact of the scrappage policy would be positive in terms of 
value added. In the 'Scrappage All' scenario, Poland (EUR 720 million/year), Italy 
(EUR 337 million/year), France (EUR 281 million/year), and Germany (EUR 277 million/year) 
would be the countries with the largest gains in terms of GVA. In the 'Scrappage SHB' 
scenario, 41% of the increase in the GVA takes place in Poland, 11% in Germany, 8.5% in 
Slovenia and 7% in the United Kingdom. In most MS the increase in the value added is 
mainly driven by the change in the domestic stock of appliances. However, in the case of 
Germany, the impact is mostly due to the growth in the investment in heating appliances 
abroad. 
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3.3. Cost-benefit analysis 
Table 4 and Figure 4 depict, for the period 2018-2030, the average annual emissions 
abated by type of appliance replaced, and the associated costs and monetised health 
benefits.10 The 'Scrappage All' scheme could achieve the maximum possible reduction in the 
emissions of PM10 (-126 kt) by replacing all the 'non-controlled' appliances with new ones. 
The total investment costs of this system would be EUR 6.4 billion, with an average PM 
abatement cost of EUR 50 682/t. 
 
Table 4. Average annual emissions abated (tonnes/year), average annualised costs and health 
benefits (million €/year), and PM abatement costs (€/tonne) of the scrappage programme by type 
of appliance, EU-27, 2018-2030 
 100% of appliances scrapped 
Emissions Costs Abatement 
cost 
Health benefits 
low case 
Health benefits 
high case 
(tonnes/year) (million €/year) (€/tonne) (million €/year) (million €/year) 
S
cr
a
p
p
a
g
e
 A
ll
 
S
cr
a
p
p
a
g
e
 
S
H
B
 
SHB-M-HC2 48.3 0.6 12 987 1.1 3.3 
SHB-M-HC1 15 016.5 196.9 13 113 351.4 1 013.6 
SHB-M-FWD 7 384.1 116.8 15 823 172.8 498.4 
 STOVE-H-FWD 62 368.2 3 224.0 51 693 1 459.4 4 209.9 
FPLACE-FWD 24 707.5 1 557.9 63 055 578.2 1 667.8 
STOVE-H-HC1 15 510.0 1 116.9 72 013 362.9 1 046.9 
STOVE-H-HC2 527.9 38.2 72 360 12.4 35.6 
SHB-M-DC 103.3 15.8 153 358 2.4 7.0 
STOVE-H-DC 181.6 110.9 610 653 4.2 12.3 
  Total 125 847.4 6 378.1 50 682* 2 944.8 8 494.7 
Source: GAINS and own elaboration. 
Note1: Costs refer to the average annualised values of the period between 2018 and 2020 compared to the costs of the 'Ecodesign' 
scenario. Emissions abated and related benefits refer to the average levels of 2018-2030 compared to those of the 'Ecodesign' 
scenario. 
Note2: The marginal benefit adopted for the calculation of health benefits corresponds to the median value of a life year (VOLY), i.e. 
EUR 23 400/t PM10 assuming a share of 90% of PM2.5 in PM10), for the low case and to the mean value of statistical life (VSL), i.e. 
EUR 67 500/t PM10, for the high case. These values have been derived from the figures reported in AEA Technology Environment 
(2005) for PM2.5 (EUR 26 000/t PM2.5 and EUR 75 000/t PM2.5), and assuming a share of 90% of PM2.5 in PM10. 
Note3: See Table A2 in the Annex for a description of appliances. 
Note4: * = average cost. 
 
Since the 'Scrappage SHB' mechanism only covers a subset of the appliances included in 
the 'Scrappage All' mechanism, the emission reductions are lower. However, the 'Scrappage 
SHB' mechanism can achieve 18% of the maximum reduction of the 'Scrappage All' 
                                              
10 Health benefits refer to the monetary value of the reduction in chronic mortality in lost years of life valued 
according to the median value of a life year (VOLY) for the low case and to the mean value of statistical life 
(VSL) for the high case. The marginal benefit adopted in this study ranges from EUR 23 400/t PM10 for the 
low case to EUR 67 500/t PM10 for the high case, and has been derived from the figures reported in AEA 
Technology Environment (2005) for PM2.5 (EUR 26 000/t PM2.5 and EUR 75 000/t PM2.5), assuming a share 
of 90% of PM2.5 in PM10. Note that these marginal benefit values are taken from the CAFE analysis 
underpinning the 2005 Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution and are not fully updated and only provide an 
indicative range. 
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mechanism while cutting total abatement costs and subsidies by a factor of 20 (i.e. limiting 
investment costs and subsidies to 4.9% of the costs of the 'Scrappage All' scenario). 
 
Figure 4. Average marginal costs and marginal benefits of the scrappage programme, EU-27, 
2018-2030 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
Note1: 100% abated emissions corresponds to the maximum reduction in PM10 emissions that can be obtained by the 
replacement of all 'non-controlled' appliances (i.e. 141 kt, representing 95% of the emissions from 'non-controlled' 
appliances). 
Note2: The marginal benefit adopted for the calculation of health benefits corresponds to the median value of a life year 
(VOLY), i.e. EUR 23 400/t PM10 assuming a share of 90% of PM2.5 in PM10), for the low case and to the mean value of 
statistical life (VSL), i.e. EUR 67 500/t PM10, for the high case. These values have been derived from the figures reported in 
AEA Technology Environment (2005) for PM2.5 (EUR 26 000/t PM2.5 and EUR 75 000/t PM2.5), and assuming a share of 90% 
of PM2.5 in PM10. 
 
Figure 4 shows the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves in terms of million euros per 
percentage of emissions abated. For the case of the median value of a life year (VOLY) 
(low case), the marginal benefit equals the marginal costs at a level at which 18% of the 
maximum reduction in the emissions from 'non-controlled' appliances is achieved. This level 
of pollution would imply the accelerated scrappage of SHB. Taking the mean value of 
statistical life (VSL) (high case) as a reference, the marginal benefit equals the marginal 
costs at a level at which 87% of the maximum reduction in the emissions from 'non-
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controlled' appliances is achieved including, in addition to the replacement of SHB, the 
substitution of firewood-fired stoves and fireplaces. In that case, the replacement of SHB 
would contribute to 20% of the reduction and 6% of the costs, while the replacement of 
stoves and fireplaces would contribute to 80% of the emissions reduction and 94% of the 
costs. 
Comparing investment costs and health benefits (see Table 4), and focusing on the most 
conservative value of life, in the year 2025, the costs derived from the 'Scrappage All' 
scenario total EUR 6.4 billion, exceeding the health benefits by EUR 3.4 billion. In contrast, 
for the 'Scrappage SHB' the health benefits (EUR 525 million) are greater than the costs 
(EUR 314 million). In the case of the highest value of life, the health benefits exceed the 
costs by EUR 2.1 billion in the 'Scrappage All' scenario and by EUR 1.2 billion in the 
'Scrappage SHB' scenario.11 
When subsidies are limited to covering up to 20% of the investment costs, in the 
'Scrappage All' scenario the average annualised investment costs are reduced to a total of 
EUR 2 billion/year and the health benefits range between EUR 0.9 billion and EUR 2.7 billion 
per year. Under the 'Scrappage SHB' scheme with subsidies limited to 20%, the investment 
costs average EUR 88 million/year and the health benefits range between EUR 147 million 
and EUR 424 million. 
Focusing on the 'Scrappage SHB' scenario, it is worth highlighting that the replacement of 
the whole stock of 'non-controlled' SHB can achieve a significant share of the reduction in 
emissions while limiting investment costs and subsidies. However, the subsidies of such a 
mechanism could be very onerous. Thus, if we take the 'Scrappage SHB' scenario as a 
starting point and limit the subsidies to 20% of the investment costs, it would reduce the 
emissions abated by a factor of 3.6 (from 22.4 kt to 6.4 kt), decrease the total investment 
costs of the mechanism by a factor of 3.6 (from EUR 7.4 billion to EUR 2.1 billion) and cut 
the total subsidies by a factor of 11.8 (from EUR 4.8 billion to EUR 411 million). However, 
although this policy scenario is estimated to significantly reduce the subsidies, it would 
increase the level of emissions of the whole period, and thus reduce the health benefits 
derived from the abatement of PM10 emissions. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This document explores the potential for the use of a market-based instrument to 
contribute to reducing the emissions of particulate matter of less than 10 micrometres 
(PM10) from household heating appliances in the framework of the review of the Thematic 
Strategy on Air Pollution (TSAP). The study is focused on the assessment of the economic 
and environmental impacts of possible scrappage policies for promoting the accelerated 
replacement of existing heating appliances with cleaner ones. Under these policy 
programmes, households replacing an old appliance with a cleaner one would receive a 
subsidy from the government. This subsidy would compensate households for the residual 
value of the scrapped appliance and the opportunity costs of the early investment in a new 
one. 
                                              
11 Note that total health benefits are calculated using average damage functions, while real health impacts of 
emissions depend on many specific factors (e.g. exposure to emissions from household boilers is likely to 
occur in densely populated areas and lead to higher-than-average health costs). 
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Two different scenarios were analysed: a 'Scrappage All' scenario where all the different 
types of conventional appliances that do not incorporate any emission control technology 
('non-controlled' appliances) are replaced, and a 'Scrappage SHB' scenario where only 'non-
controlled' firewood- and hard-coal-fired manual single house boilers (SHB) are replaced. It 
was assumed that the scrappage programme is in force for three years (between 2018 and 
2020). For each of these scenarios, the study further focused on the effects of different 
levels of replacement of the 'non-controlled' appliances and the size of subsidies relative to 
the investment costs. 
Results for the EU-27 show that a scrappage programme designed to replace all types of 
'non-controlled' appliances, and with subsidies limited to 20% of the investment costs, 
could contribute to the reduction of the emissions of PM10 from household heating 
appliances in 2020 by 18% (-79 kt), with a reduction of 7.4% (-22 kt/year) with respect to 
the average emissions of the period 2018-2030. This early replacement would increase 
average annual investment costs of the period 2018-2030 by 11% (+ EUR 1.5 billion/year). 
Total subsidies to compensate households for the early replacement would amount to 
EUR 9.4 billion during the period 2018-2020. Health benefits of this policy scenario would 
total between EUR 0.9 billion and EUR 2.7 billion per year. This scheme would increase the 
Gross Value Added (GVA) by EUR 2.3 billion/year.  
The scrappage mechanism that only targets SHB, and with subsidies limited to 20% of the 
costs, could achieve 9% of the reduction resulting from the previous 'Scrappage All' 
scenario, while cutting the abatement costs and subsidies to 3.7% and 4.9% respectively. 
This mechanism would reduce PM10 emissions in 2020 by 3% (-13.3 kt) and the average 
emissions of the period 2018-2030 by 0.7% (-2.1 kt), and the costs would increase by 
0.5% (EUR 55.6 million/year). Total subsidies during the period 2018-2020 would sum to 
EUR 411 million. Health benefits would range from EUR 147 million and EUR 424 million 
per year. Around 50% of the investment costs and subsidies, and 61% of the reduction in 
PM10 emissions, would be generated by the accelerated replacement of SHB in Poland. 
This scrappage mechanism would increase the GVA by EUR 106 million/year; 42% of the 
total increase in the GVA would be in Poland, 11% in Germany, 8.5% in Slovenia and 7% in 
the United Kingdom. 
 
  
 14 
REFERENCES 
Amann, M., Bertok, I., Borken-Kleefeld, J., Cofala, J., Heyes, C., Hoeglund-Isaksson, L., 
Klimont, Z., Nguyen, T.B., Posch, M., Rafaj, P., Sandler, R., Schöpp, W., Wagner, F., Winiwarter, 
W., 2011. Cost-effective control of air quality and greenhouse gases in Europe: Modeling 
and policy applications. Environmental Modelling & Software, 26(12), 1489-1501. 
 
AEA Technology Environment, 2005. Damages per tonne emission of PM2.5, NH3, SO2, NOx 
and VOCs from each EU25 Member State (excluding Cyprus) and surrounding seas, for 
Service Contract for carrying out cost-benefit analysis of air quality related issues, in 
particular in the Clean Air For Europe (CAFE) programme. 
 
Bio Intelligence Service, 2009. Preparatory studies for Eco-design Requirements of EuPs (II). 
Lot 15: solid fuel small combustion installations. Task 2: economic and market analysis. 
 
Bio Intelligence Service, 2010. Preparatory studies for Eco-design Requirements of EuPs (II). 
Lot 15: solid fuel small combustion installations. Task 8: policy implementation. 
 
CEC, 2005. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament - Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution, {SEC(2005) 1132} {SEC(2005) 1133} /* 
COM/2005/0446 final */ Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium. 
 
CEC, 2002. Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme. 
 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1185 of 24 April 2015 implementing Directive 
2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ecodesign 
requirements for solid fuel local space heaters. 
 
Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1189 of 28 April 2015 implementing Directive 
2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to ecodesign 
requirements for solid fuel boilers. 
 
Directive 2009/125/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 
establishing a framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-related 
products. 
 
Klimont, Z., J. Cofala, I. Bertok, M. Amann, C. Heyes, Gyarfas, F., 2002. Modelling Particulate 
Emissions in Europe. A Framework to Estimate Reduction Potential and Control Costs. IR-
02-076. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria. 
 
Kratena, K., Streicher, G., Temurshoev, U., Amores, A.F., Arto, I., Mongelli, I., Neuwahl, F., 
Rueda-Cantuche, J.M., Andreoni, V., 2013. FIDELIO 1: Fully Interregional Dynamic 
Econometric Long-term Input-Output Model for the EU27. JRC Scientific and Policy Reports 
European Commission. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
 
Michelsen, C.C., Madlener, R., 2012. Homeowners' preferences for adopting innovative 
residential heating systems: A discrete choice analysis for Germany. Energy Economics, 34, 
1271–1283. 
 15 
ANNEX 
Table A1. PM10 emissions (tonnes) in the Ecodesign scenario and emissions abated by scrappage scenario, 2020 and average emissions 2018-2030  
 2020  Average 2018-2030 
 
Total 
emissions 
 Emissions abated  
Total 
emissions 
 Emissions abated 
 
Ecodesign  
Scrappage 
All 
Scrappage 
All 20% 
Scrappage 
SHB 
Scrappage 
SHB 20% 
 Ecodesign  
Scrappage 
All 
Scrappage 
All 20% 
Scrappage 
SHB 
Scrappage 
SHB 20% 
Austria 5 167  -670 -214 -105 -29  4 021  -334 -58 -47 -1 
Belgium 3 419  -1 556 -498 -161 -45  2 453  -872 -203 -85 -16 
Bulgaria 10 978  -5 817 -1 861 -851 -238  7 026  -2 885 -480 -477 -111 
Cyprus 56  -23 -7 -2 -1  43  -12 -2 -1 0 
Czech Rep. 13 526  -7 898 -2 527 -2 588 -725  9 389  -4 198 -905 -964 150 
Denmark 12 515  -7 046 -2 255 -1 588 -445  8 659  -3 493 -537 -744 -61 
Estonia 3 795  -2 019 -646 -552 -155  2 627  -1 093 -220 -289 -52 
Finland 6 499  -1 790 -573 -1 234 -345  4 642  -1 009 -242 -657 -126 
France 79 214  -30 707 -9 826 -923 -258  52 093  -12 941 434 -348 49 
Germany 23 684  -3 788 -1 212 -225 -63  20 327  -2 228 -588 -128 -32 
Greece 9 270  -6 825 -2 184 -491 -138  5 780  -3 397 -500 -225 -14 
Hungary 10 142  -8 021 -2 567 -1 903 -533  6 615  -3 900 -579 -683 136 
Ireland 3 585  -1 615 -517 -916 -256  2 600  -750 -90 -258 136 
Italy 26 034  -19 823 -6 343 -29 -8  18 205  -11 801 -2 678 -18 -6 
Latvia 10 551  -5 729 -1 833 -229 -64  7 213  -2 983 -585 -74 24 
Lithuania 4 472  -2 354 -753 -718 -201  2 991  -1 215 -209 -313 -4 
Luxembourg 138  -68 -22 -5 -1  96  -39 -9 -3 0 
Malta 2  0 0 0 0  2  0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 1 982  -88 -28 0 0  1 665  -57 -17 0 0 
Poland 140 247  -97 558 -31 218 -28 942 -8 104  93 443  -49 980 -9 999 -14 073 -1 619 
Portugal 12 641  -8 847 -2 831 -1 318 -369  8 468  -4 705 -959 -685 -118 
Romania 39 386  -20 940 -6 701 -1 120 -314  25 320  -10 335 -1 644 -702 -220 
Slovakia 2 428  -1 950 -624 -70 -19  1 686  -1 124 -318 -39 -9 
Slovenia 2 611  -2 058 -659 -1 923 -539  1 620  -984 -147 -924 -96 
Spain 16 858  -5 410 -1 731 -156 -44  12 057  -3 007 -755 -68 -1 
Sweden 2 779  -17 -6 0 0  2 218  -20 -13 0 0 
United Kingdom 7 162  -4 600 -1 472 -1 353 -379  5 047  -2 487 -551 -647 -65 
EU-27 449 141  -247 216 -79 109 -47 401 -13 272  306 305  -125 847 -21 856 -22 449 -2 052 
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Table A2. List of appliances, fuels and abatement technologies 
Acronym Appliance Fuel 
FPLACE-FWD Fireplace Firewood 
SHB_M-DC Single house boiler manual Derived coal 
SHB_M-FWD Single house boiler manual Firewood 
SHB_M-HC1 Single house boiler manual Hard coal grade 1 
SHB_M-HC2 Single house boiler manual Hard coal grade 2 
STOVE_H-DC Stove Derived coal 
STOVE_H-FWD Stove Firewood 
STOVE_H-HC1 Stove Hard coal grade 1 
STOVE_H-HC2 Stove Hard coal grade 2 
 
Table A3. PM 10 emissions (tonnes) from 'non-controlled' appliances by type and country in the 'Ecodesign' 
scenario, 2020 
Appliance 
Type 
FPLACE-
FWD 
SHB-M-
DC 
SHB-M-
FWD 
SHB-M-
HC1 
SHB-M-
HC2 
STOVE-
H-DC 
STOVE-H-
FWD 
STOVE-
H-HC1 
STOVE-H-
HC2 
Total 
Austria 42 45  116  23 511 26  762 
Belgium 396 1 180   9 1 103   1 690 
Bulgaria 446 61 276 670  82 4 257 361  6 154 
Cyprus 12  2    9   24 
Czech Rep. 897 14 1 070 1 807  129 4 196 325  8 437 
Denmark 996  1 626 18   4 607 34  7 281 
Estonia 566 0 562 10  2 908 43  2 092 
Finland 418  1 280    173   1 871 
France 9 659 2 388 638  17 20 070 1 224  31 997 
Germany 1 111 219 212 38 6  2 267 304 45 4 203 
Greece 1 327 0 543 7  3 5 226 28  7 134 
Hungary 655 3 675 1 440  24 5 289 403  8 488 
Ireland 43 15 2 1 011  82 116 546  1 816 
Italy 11 493   32   9 055 6  20 585 
Latvia 750  196 60   4 866 103  5 975 
Lithuania 539 1 667 136  10 1 009 163  2 523 
Luxembourg 24 0 6   1 41 0  72 
Malta           
Netherlands 37      57   94 
Poland 3 606 20 2 822 28 043 160 160 41 402 24 824 1 800 102 836 
Portugal 1 624  1 476    6 201   9 301 
Romania 1 952  1 206 48   18 628 26  21 860 
Slovakia 139 0 69 9  1 1 729 88  2 035 
Slovenia   2 155    144   2 299 
Spain 569   172   4 333 619  5 693 
Sweden       19   19 
United Kingdom 720 3 654 852  18 1 466 1 287  5 000 
EU-27 38 020 386 16 067 35 107 166 560 137 681 30 408 1 845 260 239 
Source: GAINS and own elaboration 
Note: the appliances covered by the 'Scrappage SHB 'scenario are firewood-fired manual single house boilers (SHB-M-FWD) and hard-coal-fired manual single 
house boilers (SHB-M-HC1 and SHB-M-HC2). 
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SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
 
 
'Baseline' scenario 
 
For the years 2020, 2025 and 2030 the emission levels and the investment costs are 
directly derived from GAINS. Data for the other years in the 2020-2045 series is calculated 
as follows: 
1. For the rest of the years between 2020 and 2045, the energy use14 is extrapolated on 
the basis of the energy growth rate by country r, appliance a, fuel f, technology c and 
year t (indicating 2020, 2025 and 2030) calculated as follows: 
a. for each five year period (e.g. 2020-2025), if the energy use in the starting (ts) 
and end (te) years is non-zero, we compute the growth rate according to the 
corresponding average annual growth rate calculated as: 
 
 
 
1
tsc,f,a,r,BL_rgn
tec,f,a,r,BL_rgn
cf,a,r,nrg_growth
5
1






                                              (1) 
where BL_nrg  is the energy consumption by region, appliance, fuel, technology 
and year in the 'Baseline' scenario; 
b. if the energy use is zero for ts and non-zero for te or vice versa, we assume a 
linear growth in the energy mix between the two years. 
2. The emissions of PM10 for each country, appliance, fuel and technology are calculated 
by multiplying the corresponding energy consumption by the relevant emission 
coefficients from GAINS, i.e.: 
     c,f,a,rBL_PMcoeft,c,f,a,rBL_nrgt,c,f,a,rBL_PM                    (2) 
3. In order to estimate the annual costs, we multiply the energy use obtained from Step 1 
by the annualised total costs per unit of energy used: 
     c,f,a,rBL_costt,c,f,a,rBL_nrgt,c,f,a,rBL_yr_cost                    (3) 
It is important to note that the unit costs reported by GAINS include only additional 
costs, compared to the value of 'non-controlled' appliances. For instance, for new 
appliances, GAINS unit costs only include the additional cost of a new appliance 
compared to a conventional one and for 'non-controlled' appliances costs are zero. In 
contrast, in our modelling exercise, costs of appliances include total costs. 
4. The next steps consist of converting the discounted annual costs into current change in 
the stock of appliances to be introduced as external shocks into the FIDELIO model: 
    
c A
t,c,f,a,rBL_yr_costt,f,a,rBL_addstock
1
                                (4) 
In (4) 
A
1
 denotes the annualisation factor as used in GAINS, which is defined as: 
                                              
14 Table A4 shows a summary of the energy use by type of appliance for the different scenarios. 
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 
  11
1



l
l
i
ii
A                                                          (5) 
where l is the lifetime15 of the appliance and i is the interest rate (4%), which reflects 
the long-term risk-free  interest rate.16 In this case, since there is no early replacement 
of appliances, the net addition to the stock of appliances would be equal to the gross 
one. 
 
'Ecodesign' scenario 
 
The 'Ecodesign' scenario takes the energy use of the 'Baseline' scenario as a starting point. 
On top of this energy use, it is assumed that from 2018 onwards the stock of 'non-
controlled' fireplaces, automatic and manual single house boilers and stoves would be 
gradually replaced by new appliances complying with more stringent standards. This 
substitution is assumed to be linear, according to the depreciation rates of each appliance. 
As a consequence, the energy use of old appliances decreases over time and is 
compensated by an equivalent increase in the energy use of 'ecodesigned' appliances. By 
the year 2045 the whole stock of appliances would have been replaced. 
1. The change in the energy use of existing appliances between 2018 and 2045 is defined 
as: 
   
  





 

al
1td
tc,f,a,r,BL_rgnc,2018f,a,r,ED_rgchangen 1                     (6) 
Where  al  is the lifetime of each appliance (including fireplaces, automatic and 
manual single house boilers, and stoves) and td is the number of years elapsed since 
the approbation of the new emission standards (td = 1,…,   1al ). 
For each type of appliance a, fuel f, country r and year t, the energy use of the stock of 
'ecodesigned' appliances is equivalent to the sum of the reduction in the energy use of 
the appliances replaced: 
   
c
c,2018f,a,r,ED_rgchangened,2018f,a,r,ED_rgchangen              (7) 
2. The energy use of the 'Ecodesign' scenario will be: 
     
     
   tother,f,a,r,BL_rgntother,f,a,r,ED_rgn
ted,f,a,r,ED_rgchangentc,f,a,r,BL_rgnted,f,a,r,ED_rgn
tc,f,a,r,ED_rgchangentc,f,a,r,BL_rgntc,f,a,r,ED_rgn



           (8) 
Where other represents those appliances not covered by the Ecodesign Directive. 
                                              
15 The lifetime of appliances is 25 years for fireplaces, 15 years for single house boilers and 15 years for 
stoves. 
16 Note that when the interest rate approaches zero, the annualised factor approaches the inverse of the 
appliance lifetime, i.e. l/Alim
i
1
0


. This simply reflects the fact that in the case of an (almost) zero interest 
rate, the annualised value of an appliance is constant and equal over the entire lifetime of the appliance.   
19 
3. The emissions are derived straightforwardly from the energy consumption of the
'Scrappage' scenario and the corresponding emission factors as for equation (2). For
new appliances added to the stock from 2018 onwards, the coefficients correspond to
the emission limit value (ELV) of the draft impact17 assessment of the implementing
measures for local space heaters and solid fuel boilers of the Directive setting the
ecodesign requirements for energy-related products (Directive 2009/125/EC). For the
other appliances, the emission factors are those reported by GAINS.
4. Finally, annualised costs and changes in the stock of appliances are calculated as for
the 'Baseline' scenario. In the case of 'ecodesigned' appliances, costs are derived from
the preparatory studies for Ecodesign Requirements of Directive 2009/125/EC for solid
fuel small combustion installations (Bio Intelligence Service, 2009) and from GAINS.
'Scrappage' scenario 
In order to assess the impact of the scrappage mechanism, the following procedure is 
applied: 
1. For the year 2020, we recalculate for each country, appliance and fuel the energy use
of the 'non-controlled' appliances to be replaced and the corresponding energy use of
'ecodesigned' appliances according to a given policy target (or share of appliances
replaced):
     
     2020,noc,f,a,rED_nrgg2020,ed,f,a,rED_rgn2020,ed,f,a,rSC_rgn
2020,noc,f,a,rED_nrgg12020,noc,f,a,rSC_rgn


  (9) 
where noc denotes 'non-controlled' appliances eligible for the scrappage mechanism 
and  10 ,g   is a policy target which defines the share of appliances replaced. For 
other appliances not affected by the scrappage mechanism, the energy use would be 
equal to that of the 'Ecodesign' scenario. 
2. The difference between the energy consumption in the 'Ecodesign' and 'Scrappage'
scenarios for 2025 represents the change in the energy consumption due to the
scrappage policy, i.e.:
     2020,c,f,a,rED_nrg2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg           (10) 
It is assumed that these changes are equally distributed among the three years in
which the scrappage mechanism is operative (2018-2020). Thus, the energy
consumption of the 'Scrappage' scenario is given by:
     
     
     2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg2020,c,f,a,cED_nrg2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg
2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg322019,c,f,a,cED_nrg2019,c,f,a,rSC_nrg
2020,c,f,a,rSC_nrg312018,c,f,a,cED_nrg2018,c,f,a,rSC_nrg



 (11) 
From 2020 onwards, the energy use of 'non-controlled' and 'ecodesigned' appliances is 
calculated following the method described in equations (6) to (8). 
3. Emissions and annualised costs are derived from the energy use of the 'Scrappage'
scenario following the method described for the 'Ecodesign' scenario.
17 See footnote 2. 
 20 
In the 'Scrappage' scenario we have two new elements in comparison to the 'Ecodesign' 
scenario. First, in order to calculate the net change in the stock of appliances, the residual 
value of the scrapped appliances must be deducted from the gross change in the stock of 
appliances. Second, households must be compensated with an appropriate subsidy for the 
early replacement. 
4. We start by calculating the investment in new appliances replacing 'non-controlled' 
ones. This investment takes place during the period in which the scrappage mechanism 
is in force (i.e. 2018-2020). Since it is assumed that these changes are equally 
distributed over the four years, the annual investment in new appliances is given by: 
     
 2020,2018t 
 
A
1
t,f,a,rSC_cost 2020,f,a,rSC_nrg31t,f,a,rSC_inved


   (12) 
5. The gross addition to the stock of appliances in the 'Scrappage' scenario is calculated 
as the investment in 'ecodesigned' appliances replacing 'non-controlled' ones plus the 
addition to the stock due to other appliances not affected by the scrappage 
mechanism: 
   
       

c A
c,f,a,rED_costt,c,f,a,rSC_nrg  t,c,f,a,rSC_nrg 
t,f,a,rSC_invedt,f,a,rSC_addstock_gross
1        (13) 
6. In order to calculate the net addition to the stock of appliances, the residual value of 
replaced appliances must be deducted from the stock of appliances. This residual value 
is calculated for each appliance according to the following formula: 
 
   





1lg
0s l
s
1l
 
A
1
t,noc,f,a,rED_cost2025,noc,f,a,rSC_nrg31
t,f,a,rSC_rval  (14) 
The first term in the right-hand side of (14) represents the annual depreciation of the 
stock of appliances and the second term gives the weighted cumulative age of the 
appliances replaced. 
7. The total net addition to the stock of appliances mechanism is then calculated as 
follows: 
     .t,f,a,rSC_rval-t,f,a,rSC_addstock_grosst,f,a,rscr_addstock         (15) 
This net addition to the stocks is introduced into the FIDELIO model as a change factor 
in the equations of the stock of appliances. 
In the period when the policy is in force, households replacing an old appliance with a 
cleaner one receive a subsidy from the government. This subsidy (transfer from 
government) is assumed to compensate households for the residual value of the scrapped 
appliance (rval) and for the opportunity costs of the early investment in a new one. Since in 
practice it is difficult to validate the age of the appliances, it is assumed that, in order to 
ensure that the replacement target is fully achieved, the subsidy should cover the residual 
value and the opportunity costs corresponding to the newest appliance covered by the 
target, regardless of the actual age of the appliance. 
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The size of the subsidy is calculated for each type of appliance as follows:18 
 
 
  
     
  1
1
1 1
11
1 







lg
lg
lg i
it,NEW,f,a,rinved
 
i
t,f,a,rSC_rval
t,f,a,rsubsidy         (16) 
The subsidy is introduced into the model as an increase in government transfers to 
households, which is compensated by an equivalent reduction in government expenditures 
(excluding transfers) to ensure budget neutrality. Finally, in order get a better view of the 
cost of the whole mechanism, the subsidy is annualised using the relevant factor given in 
(5). 
 
                                              
18 The subsidy should be equal to the appliance residual value and the opportunity costs of net investments in 
new appliances, that is       1111  lgisubsidySC_invedSC_rvalsubsidy , where for 
simplicity purposes we supressed all the indices. Note that 1lg  denotes the remaining lifetime of the new 
appliance under the policy target g  that defines the share of non-controlled appliances to be replaced, 
Simple algebraic transformations of the above expression then yield equation (20). 
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Table A4. Energy use by scenario and type of appliance (petajoules) 
Baseline Ecodesign Scrappage All Scrappage All 20% Scrappage SHB Scrappage SHB 20% Total
ED NOC-e NOC-o Other ED NOC-e NOC-o Other ED NOC-e NOC-o Other ED NOC-e NOC-o Other ED NOC-e NOC-o Other ED NOC-e NOC-o Other 
2018 0 632 8 359 2 921 117 591 8 339 2 864 279 430 8 339 2 864 169 540 8 339 2 864 166 542 8 339 2 864 131 578 8 339 2 864 11 912 
2019 0 616 8 258 2 879 237 537 8 216 2 763 560 213 8 216 2 763 340 433 8 216 2 763 334 439 8 216 2 763 264 510 8 216 2 763 11 753 
2020 0 601 8 159 2 843 359 486 8 095 2 663 845 0 8 095 2 663 514 331 8 095 2 663 506 339 8 095 2 663 400 445 8 095 2 663 11 603 
2021 0 568 8 024 2 787 468 423 7 939 2 549 891 0 7 939 2 549 585 306 7 939 2 549 594 297 7 939 2 549 497 394 7 939 2 549 11 379 
2022 0 535 7 892 2 734 574 365 7 786 2 438 938 0 7 786 2 438 656 282 7 786 2 438 680 258 7 786 2 438 591 347 7 786 2 438 11 162 
2023 0 504 7 763 2 685 675 312 7 636 2 330 987 0 7 636 2 330 729 258 7 636 2 330 765 222 7 636 2 330 684 303 7 636 2 330 10 953 
2024 0 475 7 637 2 639 774 263 7 489 2 226 1 037 0 7 489 2 226 804 234 7 489 2 226 848 189 7 489 2 226 775 263 7 489 2 226 10 752 
2025 0 447 7 514 2 597 870 220 7 344 2 125 1 089 0 7 344 2 125 880 209 7 344 2 125 929 160 7 344 2 125 864 225 7 344 2 125 10 558 
2026 0 431 7 433 2 558 966 185 7 241 2 030 1 151 0 7 241 2 030 966 185 7 241 2 030 1 015 137 7 241 2 030 958 194 7 241 2 030 10 422 
2027 0 416 7 354 2 521 1 062 153 7 140 1 936 1 214 0 7 140 1 936 1 053 161 7 140 1 936 1 100 115 7 140 1 936 1 051 164 7 140 1 936 10 290 
2028 0 402 7 276 2 485 1 156 122 7 040 1 845 1 278 0 7 040 1 845 1 142 137 7 040 1 845 1 184 94 7 040 1 845 1 144 135 7 040 1 845 10 163 
2029 0 389 7 200 2 450 1 249 94 6 941 1 755 1 343 0 6 941 1 755 1 231 112 6 941 1 755 1 269 74 6 941 1 755 1 236 107 6 941 1 755 10 039 
2030 0 376 7 125 2 418 1 341 68 6 843 1 666 1 409 0 6 843 1 666 1 321 88 6 843 1 666 1 354 56 6 843 1 666 1 330 80 6 843 1 666 9 919 
2031 0 366 7 052 2 387 1 434 44 6 747 1 579 1 478 0 6 747 1 579 1 414 64 6 747 1 579 1 440 38 6 747 1 579 1 424 54 6 747 1 579 9 804 
2032 0 356 6 980 2 357 1 528 21 6 652 1 493 1 548 0 6 652 1 493 1 509 40 6 652 1 493 1 528 21 6 652 1 493 1 519 29 6 652 1 493 9 693 
2033 0 346 6 910 2 329 1 524 19 6 580 1 463 1 542 0 6 580 1 463 1 527 15 6 580 1 463 1 524 19 6 580 1 463 1 524 19 6 580 1 463 9 586 
2034 0 338 6 841 2 303 1 521 17 6 509 1 434 1 538 0 6 509 1 434 1 524 14 6 509 1 434 1 521 17 6 509 1 434 1 521 17 6 509 1 434 9 482 
2035 0 329 6 774 2 278 1 520 15 6 440 1 406 1 535 0 6 440 1 406 1 522 12 6 440 1 406 1 520 15 6 440 1 406 1 520 15 6 440 1 406 9 381 
2036 0 321 6 708 2 254 1 521 12 6 372 1 379 1 533 0 6 372 1 379 1 522 11 6 372 1 379 1 521 12 6 372 1 379 1 521 12 6 372 1 379 9 284 
2037 0 314 6 644 2 232 1 522 10 6 305 1 352 1 533 0 6 305 1 352 1 523 9 6 305 1 352 1 522 10 6 305 1 352 1 522 10 6 305 1 352 9 190 
2038 0 307 6 581 2 211 1 525 8 6 239 1 327 1 534 0 6 239 1 327 1 526 8 6 239 1 327 1 525 8 6 239 1 327 1 525 8 6 239 1 327 9 099 
2039 0 301 6 520 2 192 1 530 6 6 174 1 302 1 536 0 6 174 1 302 1 530 6 6 174 1 302 1 530 6 6 174 1 302 1 530 6 6 174 1 302 9 012 
2040 0 295 6 459 2 174 1 535 4 6 111 1 277 1 540 0 6 111 1 277 1 535 5 6 111 1 277 1 535 4 6 111 1 277 1 535 4 6 111 1 277 8 928 
2041 0 289 6 401 2 158 1 542 2 6 049 1 254 1 544 0 6 049 1 254 1 541 3 6 049 1 254 1 542 2 6 049 1 254 1 542 2 6 049 1 254 8 847 
2042 0 284 6 343 2 143 1 551 0 5 988 1 231 1 551 0 5 988 1 231 1 549 2 5 988 1 231 1 551 0 5 988 1 231 1 551 0 5 988 1 231 8 770 
2043 0 279 6 287 2 129 1 556 0 5 928 1 211 1 556 0 5 928 1 211 1 556 0 5 928 1 211 1 556 0 5 928 1 211 1 556 0 5 928 1 211 8 695 
2044 0 274 6 232 2 117 1 563 0 5 870 1 192 1 563 0 5 870 1 192 1 563 0 5 870 1 192 1 563 0 5 870 1 192 1 563 0 5 870 1 192 8 624 
2045 0 270 6 179 2 107 1 571 0 5 812 1 173 1 571 0 5 812 1 173 1 571 0 5 812 1 173 1 571 0 5 812 1 173 1 571 0 5 812 1 173 8 556 
Note: ED: 'ecodesigned', NOC-e: 'non-controlled' eligible for scrappage, NOC-o: 'non-controlled' other. 
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